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APPROVAL VOTING IN PRODUCT SOCIETIES
KRISTEN MAZUR, MUTIARA SONDJAJA, MATTHEW WRIGHT, CAROLYN YARNALL
Abstract. In approval voting, individuals vote for all platforms that they find acceptable. In this situation
it is natural to ask: When is agreement possible? What conditions guarantee that some fraction of the voters
agree on even a single platform? Berg et. al. found such conditions when voters are asked to make a decision
on a single issue that can be represented on a linear spectrum. In particular, they showed that if two out
of every three voters agree on a platform, there is a platform that is acceptable to a majority of the voters.
Hardin developed an analogous result when the issue can be represented on a circular spectrum. We examine
scenarios in which voters must make two decisions simultaneously. For example, if voters must decide on the
day of the week to hold a meeting and the length of the meeting, then the space of possible options forms
a cylindrical spectrum. Previous results do not apply to these multi-dimensional voting societies because a
voter’s preference on one issue often impacts their preference on another. We present a general lower bound
on agreement in a two-dimensional voting society, and then examine specific results for societies whose
spectra are cylinders and tori.
1. Introduction.
Several articles in theMonthly have analyzed approval voting systems. The pioneering article by Berg et.
al. examined agreement in linear societies, in which voters may approve of an interval of options chosen from
a linear spectrum, and higher-dimensional analogues [1]. Recognizing that a circular model is often more
appropriate, Hardin studied approval voting in circular societies [2]. Furthermore, Klawe et. al. considered
double-interval societies, in which each voter may approve of two disjoint intervals in a linear spectrum [3].
The prior work on approval voting theory considered primarily situations in which voters are asked to
make a decision on a single issue. However, often voters are asked to make a decision on two or more issues
simultaneously. For example, suppose a group of people must decide when to hold a meeting and how long
the meeting should be. Further suppose that each person is permitted to choose both an interval of possible
start times and an interval of possible meeting lengths. The approval set of each voter can be represented
as a rectangle in a two-dimensional spectrum, as in Figure 1.
The example of Figure 1 illustrates the importance of considering multiple choices simultaneously, rather
than selecting a position of maximal approval in each choice separately. Figure 1 displays the approval sets of
five voters. Clearly, a majority of voters prefers a meeting with a later start time. A different majority prefers
a shorter meeting length. If these preferences were considered independently, the chosen meeting parameters
would fall in the purple rectangle, which is acceptable to only a single voter. However, considering start time
and meeting length simultaneously, then the maximal approval occurs in the areas where two voters agree.
This paper examines approval voting in product societies, in which voters are asked to make multiple
decisions simultaneously. For example, suppose a committee wants to create an annual conference. They
must decide on the length of the conference (in days) and what time of year to hold the conference. Since
the former spectrum is linear and the latter is circular, approval sets can be modeled as rectangles on a
cylinder. Thus, this society is a cylindrical society. Or, in [2] Hardin gave the circular society example of a
group of scouts lost in the woods needing to decide on a compass bearing. Now suppose that these scouts
must also decide on how long to walk in a given direction. Then again this is a cylindrical society. Finally,
suppose an astronomy class must decide on a time of year to look at the stars and on a compass direction to
point the telescope. Both of these spectra are circular, and their product is a torus. Hence, we have created
a toroidal society.
In such product societies, we answer the following question: “If we know voters’ agreement on each choice
individually, what can we say about their agreement on all issues simultaneously?” After analyzing such
product societies in general, we give more specific results for cylindrical and torodial societies.
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Figure 1. Approval regions of five voters who are asked to give approval intervals for both
the start time of a meeting and the meeting length.
In the next section we review results from [1] and [2], define product societies, and discuss why the linear
and circular results do not always extend to multidimensional societies. Section 3 provides a general theorem
about the lower bound on the maximum number of voters who agree in product societies. In Section 4 we
employ the concept of an agreement graph to give a new lower bound on the agreement of cylindrical societies.
Section 5 presents a similar theorem for toroidal societies, along with the construction of a type of “uniform”
toroidal society with low overall agreement.
2. Preliminaries.
We use terminology from [1] and [2]. A platform is an item or candidate for which an individual can vote.
We call the collection of all possible platforms a spectrum X . Further, let V be a finite collection of voters.
Each voter v in V has an approval set Av ⊆ X of platforms acceptable to the voter. We denote the collection
of all approval sets of all voters in V by A. Then define a society S to be a triple (X,V,A) consisting of a
spectrum X , a finite collection of voters V and the corresponding collection of approval sets A. Define the
size of S, denoted |S|, to be the number of voters in S. The agreement number a(S) of a society S is the
greatest number of voters that approve a single platform, and the agreement proportion is the ratio a(S)|S| .
Finally, let k and m be integers such that 1 ≤ k ≤ m ≤ |S|. A society is (k,m)-agreeable if k out of every
m voters agree on some platform.
Berg et. al. introduced the notion of (k,m)-agreeability to model the diversity of preferences within a
linear societies [1]. The spectrum of a linear society is a closed subset of R and approval sets are closed and
bounded intervals in R. We provide an example of a (2, 3)-agreeable linear society with agreement number
4 in Figure 2.
Intuitively, in a (k,m)-agreeable society, k and m parametrize the amount of overlap between voters’
approval sets; the closer k is to m, the more similar the preferences of any m voters. For example, if a
society is (k, k)-agreeable then every group of k voters unanimously approves of some platform.
Since (k, k)-agreeability seems to be a very strong condition, we might predict that this would imply that
there must be a platform that is approved by a large proportion of voters. Indeed, if a linear society is
(k, k)-agreeable with k ≥ 2, then Helly’s Theorem1, a result about intersections of convex sets, asserts that
there must be a platform that is approved by every voter.
While (k, k)-agreeability can lead to strong conclusions, this condition is very restrictive and may not
be realistic for a typical society. The condition of (k,m)-agreeability, for k ≤ m, thus allows us to model
societies that are very agreeable, very “disagreeable,” or something in between. In particular, the larger
m is relative to k, the more “disagreeable” a (k,m)-agreeable society might be. Note that if a society is
(k,m)-agreeable, it is also (k′,m)-agreeable for k′ ≤ k.
For example, in a (1,m)-agreeable society it may be possible to find a group of m voters in which none of
the voters agree on a platform. Note, however, that even if a society is (1,m)-agreeable, it does not necessarily
1More generally, Helly’s Theorem implies that a (d + 1, d + 1)-agreeable society whose approval sets are convex subsets of
R
d must contain a platform that is approved by every voter.
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have a small agreement proportion; (1,m)-agreeability simply asserts that among an arbitrary group of m
voters in the society, we cannot guarantee that there are two voters who approve of a common platform.
Thus, conclusions that we derive from assuming (k,m)-agreeability are only lower bounds to agreement
proportions. Nevertheless, we might intuitively predict that the lower bound on agreement proportions of
such societies will be small. The main theorem of [1] stated below confirms this intuition for linear societies.
Figure 2. A (2, 3)-agreeable linear society with six voters and agreement number 4. The
black line is the (infinite) spectrum, and each colored segment represents the approval set
of one voter.
Theorem 1 (Agreeable Linear Society Theorem [1]). Let 2 ≤ k ≤ m. In a (k,m)-agreeable linear society
S, the best possible lower bound for the agreement proportion of S is (k − 1)/(m− 1).
In other words, if S is a (k,m)-agreeable linear society, then a(S)|S| ≥ (k − 1)/(m− 1), and there exists a
(k,m)-agreeable linear society such that the agreement proportion equals (k − 1)/(m− 1).
Hardin proved a similar theorem for circular societies [2]. A circular society is a society in which the
spectrum is a circle and the approval sets are connected subsets of the circle. Thus, approval sets are typically
arcs. We give an example of a (2, 2)-agreeable circular society with agreement number 2 in Figure 3. Hardin’s
main result in [2] is the following lower bound on the agreement proportion of circular societies.
Figure 3. A (2, 2)-agreeable circular society with three voters and agreement number 2.
The black circle is the spectrum, and colored arcs represent approval sets.
Theorem 2 (Agreeable Circular Society Theorem [2]). Let 2 ≤ k ≤ m. If S is a (k,m)-agreeable circular
society, then
a(S)
|S|
>
k − 1
m
,
and there exists a (k,m)-agreeable circular society such that a(S) = ⌊k−1
m
|S|⌋+ 1.
A product society is, in essence, the Cartesian product of two societies. More specifically, let (X,V,AX)
and (Y, V,AY ) be societies that share the same collection of voters V . In the product of these two societies,
voters from the set V approve of platforms on the two independent spectra and the approval set of a
single voter is the product of their approval sets from X and Y . Thus, a product society is the triple
(X × Y, V,AX×Y ), where AX×Y = {AXv ×A
Y
v | v ∈ V }.
If S = (X × Y, V,AX×Y ) is a product society in which both spectra X and Y are linear, then S is a
2-box society. Its spectrum X × Y is R2, and the approval sets AXv ×A
Y
v of voters in V are rectangles. We
note that one may wish to study a society whose spectrum of platforms is a finite rectangle. In this case,
we could still consider the collection of approval sets as subsets of the larger space, R2. Berg et. al. first
defined a 2-box society in [1]. In fact, for d ≥ 1 they generalize the notion of a 2-box society to that of a
d-box society whose spectrum is Rd. Approval sets in d-box societies are then boxes in Rd. Theorem 13 of
[1] gives a lower bound on the agreement number of a (k,m)-agreeable d-box society. However, we will just
state the theorem for a 2-box society.
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Theorem 3 (Agreeable 2-Box Society Theorem [1]). Let m, k ≥ 2 be integers with k ≤ m ≤ 2k − 2, and
let S be a (k,m)-agreeable 2-box society. Then the agreement number of S is at least |S| −m + k, and this
bound is best possible.
A product society in which one spectrum is linear and the other is circular is a cylindrical society. A
product society in which both spectra are circular is a toroidal society. Neither cylindrical nor toroidal
societies have yet been studied in the literature. Moreover, just as Theorem 1 does not extend to circular
societies, Theorem 3 does not extend to cylindrical and toroidal societies.
Furthermore, neither cylindrical nor toroidal societies behave exactly like circular societies. Indeed, we
construct below cylindrical and toroidal societies for which the inequality given in Theorem 2 does not
provide a lower bound on agreement. Define a stratified society to be a product society whose spectrum is
partitioned into disjoint regions called strata such that each voter’s approval set is completely contained in
a single stratum.
Example 4. Let S be a cylindrical or toroidal stratified society consisting of 20 voters whose approval sets
lie in four strata. Further, suppose that each stratum contains five pairwise-intersecting approval sets such
that the agreement number in each stratum is 3. In Figure 4 we give an example of such a society. By the
pigeon-hole principle, S is (2, 5)-agreeable. If Theorem 2 applied to S, then the agreement number would be
at least four. However, the agreement number of this society is in fact three. Therefore, an understanding
of cylindrical and toroidal societies requires further exploration.
one strata
Figure 4. A cylindrical stratified society containing four strata (left). Each stratum con-
tains five pairwise-intersecting approval sets with cross section as shown (right).
3. Agreement Numbers in Product Societies.
In this section, we provide a lower bound for the agreement number of (k,m)-agreeable product societies.
We then analyze the strength of the bound.
3.1. A bound for the agreement number. We begin by examining certain projections within a product
society. Let S = (X×Y, V,AX×Y ) be a product society. Let SX be the projection of S onto the spectrum X
and SY the projection onto Y ; that is, SX = (X,V,AX) and SY = (Y, V,AY ). Note that |SX | = |SY | = |S|.
Further, let pX be a platform with maximal agreement in SX . In other words, pX is the location in X of
the agreement number a(SX). Define pY analogously. Let S˜pX be the subsociety of S that consists of the
subset of voters that approve of pX . So, |S˜pX | = a(S
X). Then let S˜Y
pX
be the projection of S˜pX onto the
spectrum Y . We define S˜X
pY
analogously.
Lemma 5. Let S = (X × Y, V,AX×Y ) be a product society. Then
a(S) ≥ a(S˜YpX ) and a(S) ≥ a(S˜
X
pY ).
Proof. First, in order for approval sets in S to overlap, their projections must intersect in both SX and SY .
Without loss of generality, consider S˜Y
pX
. This society contains approval sets in SY whose corresponding
approval sets in S project to intersecting sets in SX . Thus, if approval sets intersect in S˜Y
pX
, then the
corresponding approval sets in S also intersect. Hence, a(S) ≥ a(S˜Y
pX
). 
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We are now ready to state our lower bound on the agreement proportion of a (k,m)-agreeable product
society. The following theorem relies on the fact that if S = (X × Y, V,AX×Y ) is a (k,m)-agreeable product
society, then the projections SX and SY are (k,m)-agreeable as well.
Theorem 6. Let S = (X × Y, V,AX×Y ) be a (k,m)-agreeable product society. Let α be the lower bound on
the agreement proportion of SX imposed from the fact that SX is (k,m)-agreeable. Let β be the analogous
lower bound on the agreement proportion of SY . If |S| ≥ mmin(α,β) , then
a(S)
|S|
≥ αβ.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let α ≤ β. By Lemma 5, a(S) ≥ a(S˜Y
pX
). Thus, we will put a bound on
a(S˜Y
pX
). The society SX is at least (k,m)-agreeable, so a(SX) ≥ |SX |α = |S|α. Since |S| ≥ m
α
, it follows
that a(SX) ≥ m. Thus, the society S˜pX contains at least m voters and is still (k,m)-agreeable. So S˜
Y
pX
is
also at least (k,m)-agreeable, and hence a(S˜Y
pX
) ≥ |S˜Y
pX
|β. Finally, |S˜Y
pX
| = a(SX), and so a(S˜Y
pX
) ≥ |S|αβ.
Hence, a(S)|S| ≥ αβ. 
If we apply Theorem 6 to 2-box, cylindrical, and toroidal societies, then we obtain the following bounds
on agreement.
Theorem 7. Let S be a (k,m)-agreeable product society.
• If S is a 2-box society and |S| ≥ m(m−1)
k−1 , then
a(S)
|S|
≥
(k − 1)2
(m− 1)2
.
• If S is a cylindrical society and |S| ≥ m(m−1)
k−1 , then
a(S)
|S|
>
(k − 1)2
m(m− 1)
.
• If S is a toroidal society and |S| ≥ m
2
k−1 , then
a(S)
|S|
>
(k − 1)2
m2
.
Proof. Let S be a (k,m)-agreeable 2-box society with |S| ≥ m(m−1)
k−1 . Then both S
X and SY are (k,m)-
agreeable linear societies with agreement proportions at least k−1
m−1 . Thus, in the notation of Theorem 6, we
have α = β = k−1
m−1 . Since
m
min(α,β) =
m(m−1)
k−1 and |S| ≥
m(m−1)
k−1 , it follows that
a(S)
|S| ≥ αβ =
(k−1)2
(m−1)2 .
The proofs for cylindrical and toroidal societies are analogous. 
For example, in a (3, 3)-agreeable cylindrical society with a sufficiently large number of voters, at least two-
thirds of the voters agree on some platform. On the other hand, a toroidal society must be (6, 6)-agreeable
for us to conclude that at least two-thirds of the voters agree on some platform.
Moreover, it may be much easier to analyze voting preferences of small groups instead of trying to
understand all preferences at once, in which case the result above is useful. For instance, suppose an
organization is trying to determine the length of a conference (in days) and what time of year to hold the
conference, and all members of the organization vote for their preferred length and date combination. As
mentioned in the Introduction, this is an example of a cylindrical society. The organization wants to choose
a length and date combination that works for at least two-thirds of the voting members. Since it may be
difficult to analyze all approval sets at once, the organization takes samples of three voters and determines
that in each sample, the three voters agree on a length and date. While it may be impractical to consider
all possible samples of three voters, based on the samples collected, the organization conjectures that the
society is (3, 3)-agreeable. Based on the hypothesis of (3, 3)-agreeability, the organization invokes Theorem 7
to conclude that there is a meeting length and date that is acceptable to at least two-thirds of the members.
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3.2. Analyzing bounds. We now discuss the strength of the result from Theorem 7 by comparing to
previous results of Berg, et. al. and considering examples in which the bound is sharp.
We first consider (k,m)-agreeable 2-box societies. Theorem 3 gives a stronger bound for 2-box societies
than Theorem 7. However, Theorem 3 only holds under strict assumptions about k and m since it requires
k ≤ m ≤ 2k − 2. The result from Theorem 7 has no restrictions on k or m and thus we may apply it to
more 2-box societies. While an assumption must be made about the size of the society in order to apply
Theorem 7, it only becomes very restrictive when m is significantly larger than k, in which case a(S) must
be small anyway.
Cylindrical and toroidal societies will be discussed in greater detail in the following two sections but first,
we provide examples demonstrating that the result from Theorem 7 is sharp in certain cases.
Example 8. Let S be the (2, 2)-agreeable cylindrical society consisting of 3 approval sets that pairwise
intersect around the cylinder in such a way that not all three intersect at any point. A cross section of this
society is shown in Figure 3. Then |S| = 3 which is greater than 2(2−1)2−1 , so we may apply Theorem 7. The
result is that a(S) > 12 |S|, giving a lower bound of 2 on the agreement number, which is the exact value of
a(S).
Example 9. Let S be the (2, 2)-agreeable toroidal society with 5 voters shown in Figure 5. To construct the
torus, we identify the sides as indicated. Since |S| > 2
2
2−1 , Theorem 7 gives a(S) >
5
4 . Thus, the result gives
a lower bound of 2 which is precisely the agreement number of the society.
Figure 5. A (2, 2)-agreeable toroidal society with 5 voters and agreement number 2.
4. Cylindrical Societies.
Before presenting our main theorem for this section, which gives a lower bound on the agreement number
of a (k,m)-agreeable cylindrical society, we first revisit the agreement number of a (k,m)-agreeable circular
society. Theorem 2 gives Hardin’s lower bound for the agreement of a (k,m)-agreeable circular society in
terms of the size of the society. His method for proving this bound relies on transforming a given circular
society to one of a particular form called a uniform society. We take a different approach involving the
agreement graph of a society.
Recall that a graph G consists of a collection of vertices V (G) and edges E(G) that join pairs of vertices.
The agreement graph G of a society S is constructed by letting V (G) consist of all voters in the society
and forming edges between vertices when the corresponding voters have intersecting approval sets. The
results in this section rely on the clique number of agreement graphs. A clique in a graph is a collection
of vertices such that each pair of vertices share an edge. The maximum clique of a graph G is a clique
with the largest number of vertices. The clique number of G, denoted ω(G), is the number of vertices in a
maximum clique of G. In an agreement graph, the clique number gives the maximal number of voters that
are pairwise-agreeable.
6
4.1. Revisiting circular societies. For a linear society, the clique number of the agreement graph is equal
to the agreement number of the society [1, Fact 1]. The same is not true for circular societies. In fact, the
clique number can be larger than the agreement number—consider a circle with three arcs that intersect
pairwise, but with no point in common to all three. We can, however, give a lower bound on the agreement
number of a circular society in terms of the clique number of its agreement graph.
Theorem 10. Let S be a circular society, and let G be the agreement graph of S. Then,
a(S) ≥
ω(G) + 1
2
.
Proof. For any circular society S the agreement graph G has some maximal clique GM of size ω(G). The
voters corresponding to the vertices of this graph form a pairwise-agreeable sub-society S¯ ⊆ S, and so S¯ is
(2, 2)-agreeable. Moreover, since a(S) ≥ a(S¯), it suffices to show that
a(S¯) ≥
ω(G) + 1
2
.
Since |S¯| = ω(G), we will show that |S¯| ≤ 2a(S¯)− 1.
We will use a construction that transforms the circular society S¯ into a linear society via a process of
cutting and “unrolling.” Let p be a point (i.e., a representative platform) in the intersection of a(S¯) = a
approval sets. We can cut S¯ at the point p and “unroll” to form a linear spectrum. In doing so, we keep
a copy of p, call it p′, at the other end of the newly-constructed linear society and consider the two pieces
resulting from cutting the a intersecting approval sets as unique sets. In this way, we have created a linear
society SL with |S¯|+ a approval sets such that a(SL) = a(S¯). See Figure 6 for an example.
p
S¯
p p′
SL
Figure 6. We cut the spectrum of a circular society S¯ at a point p to transform S¯ into a
linear society SL with |SL| = |S¯|+ a(S¯).
The agreement graph GL of SL has |S¯|+ a vertices, which we label
v1, v2, . . . , va, v
′
1, v
′
2, . . . , v
′
a, w1, w2, . . . , w|S¯|−a,
where the vi and v
′
i are the vertices corresponding to the two pieces of each of the a intersecting approval
sets that we cut in the construction of SL, and the wj correspond to the remaining |S¯| − a approval sets.
More precisely, the vertices vi correspond to the approval sets in SL containing p, v
′
i correspond to the sets
containing p′, and wj correspond to sets that do not contain p or p
′.
Since the approval sets associated to the collection v1, . . . , va are all intersecting, we know that the
collection of these vertices in GL form a clique of size a. Likewise, the vertices v
′
1, . . . , v
′
a also form a clique of
size a. Additionally, since S¯ is (2, 2)-agreeable, the approval sets corresponding to the vertices w1, . . . w|S¯|−a
are all pairwise intersecting, so the collection of wj forms a clique of size |S¯| − a in GL.
To obtain the graph GM from the graph GL, we collapse each pair of vertices vi and v
′
i to a single vertex,
and if any wj has an edge to both vi and v
′
i, we remove one of those edges. Since GM is the complete graph
on |S¯| vertices, we know that each wj must share an edge with either vi or v
′
i for each i.
Without loss of generality, we can order the vi so that v1 corresponds to the shortest of the approval sets
containing p and va corresponds to the longest. Thus, if any wj shares an edge with a fixed vk, it must also
share an edge with every vi for k ≤ i ≤ a.
In particular, each wj must either share an edge with va or v
′
i for all i. But, if the latter case were true
for some wj , then wj ∪ {v
′
i}
a
i=1 would form a clique of size a+ 1, and for a linear society, the clique number
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of the agreement graph equals the agreement number of the society [1, Fact 1]. Thus, a clique of size a+ 1
in GL would imply that a(SL) ≥ a+ 1, which contradicts the fact that a(SL) = a(S¯) = a.
Therefore, every wj must share an edge with va. This implies that the number of wj must be less than a,
for otherwise we would again have a clique of size a + 1. Hence, |S¯| − a < a, or equivalently, |S¯| ≤ 2a− 1.
Thus, ω(G) ≥ 2a(S¯)− 1, and it follows that a(S) ≥ (ω(G) + 1)/2.

4.2. A new bound for cylindrical societies. We now turn to cylindrical societies. We will make use of
the following theorem from Berg, et. al. [1, Theorem 11] regarding the clique size of a graph.
Theorem 11. Let m, k ≥ 2 be integers with k ≤ m ≤ 2k − 2, and let G be a graph on n ≥ m vertices such
that every subset of m vertices includes a clique of size k. Then ω(G) ≥ n−m+ k.
For the same reason as in the circular society case, the clique number of the agreement graph of a
cylindrical society is not the same as the agreement number of the society. Thus, the theorem above is not
enough to immediately give a result regarding the agreement number of a cylindrical society. However, we
may use Berg’s result in conjunction with Theorem 10 to prove the following result. It is the cylindrical
society version of Theorem 3, Berg’s result for the agreement number of 2-box societies.
Theorem 12. Let k and m be integers such that 2 ≤ k ≤ m ≤ 2k− 2. If S is a (k,m)-agreeable cylindrical
society, then
a(S) ≥
|S| −m+ k + 1
2
.
Proof. Let S = (X × Y, V,AX×Y ), and let G be the agreement graph of S; by Theorem 11 there exists a
clique G′ of size |S| −m+ k in G. Let A′ ⊆ AX×Y be the collection of approval sets that correspond to the
vertices in G′. That is, A′ consists of |S| −m+ k pairwise-intersecting approval sets in X × Y .
Since S is a cylindrical society, without loss of generality, let X be a linear spectrum and Y be a circular
spectrum. Let π : X × Y → X be the canonical projection. Then the set {π(A) | A ∈ A′} is a set of
|S| −m+ k pairwise-intersecting intervals in X . By Helly’s Theorem, the intersection⋂
A∈A′
π(A)
is nonempty, so there exists some point x in this intersection. Then C = π−1(x) is a circular spectrum in
X × Y that intersects every A ∈ A′.
Let VC ⊆ V be the subset of voters whose approval sets intersect C, and let AC be the corresponding
collection of intersections of their approval sets with C. Then SC = (C, VC ,AC) is a circular society that is
the “slice” of S along C. By construction of SC , its agreement graph has a clique of size |S| −m + k. By
Theorem 10, a(SC) ≥
|S|−m+k+1
2 . Since a(S) ≥ a(SC), the proof is complete. 
As an application of Theorem 12, consider the scouts mentioned in the Introduction that are lost in the
woods. They must decide on a compass direction to travel and how long to travel in a given direction. This
cylindrical society does not want to move in any direction unless the majority agree on a direction and travel
time. With their knowledge of Theorem 12, they know that if among any 4 of them, at least 3 agree on a
direction and time, then there will be a direction and time combination that is acceptable to the majority
of the group. Conjecturing (3, 4)-agreeability, they find this result reassuring, even though the existence of
agreement does not necessarily help them get out of the woods. Note that if there are at least 6 scouts
and they form a (3, 4)-agreeable society, then both Theorem 7 and Theorem 12 apply in this situation, but
Theorem 12 gives a stronger result.
4.3. Comparing results. We now compare the bound for the agreement number of cylindrical societies from
Theorem 12 to the bound for cylindrical societies from Theorem 7. We then provide examples demonstrating
that the bound from Theorem 12 is sharp in some cases.
We first note that Theorem 7 and Theorem 12 hold under different assumptions. Theorem 7 holds only
for sufficiently large (k,m)-agreeable societies (|S| > m(m−1)
k(k−1) ), while Theorem 12 holds when k and m are
close (k ≤ m ≤ 2k − 2). Thus, each result’s strength depends on the size of societies we wish to study or
on how agreeable they are. In order to compare the two results we now only consider cylindrical societies
that satisfy both of the aforementioned assumptions. We now consider two examples which correspond to
the extreme cases from the bound k ≤ m ≤ 2k − 2.
Example 13. Let S be a (k, k)-agreeable cylindrical society. Applying the bound from Theorem 7 yields
a(S) >
k − 1
k
|S|,
while the result from Theorem 12 yields
a(S) ≥
|S|+ 1
2
.
Hence, whenever k ≥ 3, Theorem 7 is a stronger result in the case above. However, as we will see in the
example below, when m is large compared to k, Theorem 12 will sometimes give a better bound.
Example 14. Let S be a (k, 2k−2)-agreeable society with |S| > 4. Thus, we may apply Theorem 7 to obtain
a(S) >
k − 1
2(2k − 3)
|S|.
On the other hand, applying Theorem 12 gives
a(S) ≥
|S| − k + 3
2
.
For small values of k the bound from Theorem 12 is stronger in the example above, but as the value of k
increases, the bound for a(S) from Theorem 7 approaches |S|4 . In particular, the bound from Theorem 12 is
still stronger unless k > |S|/2. However, in the case k > |S|/2, we would have m > |S| − 2 and thus would
already know almost entirely the agreement number of the society.
Finally, the bound from Theorem 12 is sharp for the society in Example 8. Since the society is (2, 2)-
agreeable, Theorem 12 holds and gives a(S) ≥ 2.
5. Toroidal Societies.
We conclude with another look at toroidal societies. We first give a result analogous to Theorem 12 that
holds regardless of |S|, unlike Theorem 7. We then show that the toroidal society bounds in Theorems 7
and 15 are sharp for a specific family of toroidal societies.
Theorem 15. Let k and m be integers such that 2 ≤ k ≤ m ≤ 2k − 2. If S = (X × Y, V,AX×Y ) is a
(k,m)-agreeable toroidal society, then
a(S) ≥
|S| −m+ k + 2
4
.
Proof. This proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 12, except now the set {π(A) | A ∈ A′} consists of
|S| −m+ k pairwise-intersecting intervals in the circular society X . Hence, this set forms a (2, 2)-agreeable
circular society. Helly’s theorem no longer applies. However, by Theorem 2 there exists some platform x in
the intersection of at least |S|−m+k2 of these sets. We then define SC as we did in the proof of Theorem 12,
and by Theorem 10, a(SC) ≥
|S|−m+k
2
+1
2 =
|S|−m+k+2
4 . Therefore, a(S) ≥
|S|−m+k+2
4 as well. 
The astronomy class mentioned in the Introduction forms a toroidal society by attempting to decide on
a time of year to view the stars and a compass direction to point their telescope. They realize that even
if they form a (3, 4)-agreeable society S, then Theorem 15 only guarantees that |S|+14 class members will
agree on a time and direction combination. While the members of the class are troubled by their potential
disagreement, they are heartened by the fact the theorem only gives a lower bound.
The previous example begs the question: is the lower bound in Theorem 15 sharp? We have found sharp-
ness questions in product societies difficult to answer in general, but for (2, 2)-agreeable toroidal societies, we
are able to show that the bounds in Theorems 7 and 15 are sharp in certain cases. Specifically, we construct
and analyze an analogue of Hardin’s uniform circular societies [2] that we will call uniform toroidal societies.
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Example 16 (Uniform Toroidal Society). We construct a family of (2, 2)-agreeable uniform toroidal societies
whose agreement number is equal to
⌈
|S|−1
4
⌉
+ 1. Because we refer to |S| many times in the following, let
n = |S|. These toroidal societies are “uniform” in the sense that their approval sets are congruent squares
with regular intersection patterns. We explain the construction in detail for n ≡ 1 (mod 4), which is the
case that exhibits the most symmetry, and then explain briefly how to generalize to other n.
Let n = 4ℓ+1 for some positive integer ℓ. We construct a society S whose spectrum is the quotient space
R
2/(2nZ × 2nZ); this quotient is a torus, with the particular denominator chosen to avoid fractions in the
coordinates of approval set corners. For concreteness, we describe the n approval sets geometrically in the
square X = [0, 2n)× [0, 2n), which we identify with the quotient space above.
Let Γ be a path formed by the intersection of the lines y = 2x and y = 2x − 2n with X ; this path is
illustrated by the yellow lines in Figure 7. When opposite sides of the square X are identified to form a
torus, Γ is a closed path on the torus. We use Γ to specify the relative ordering of the corner points of the
rectangular approval sets on the torus, just as Hardin’s construction depends on the relative ordering of the
endpoints of the approval sets, which are intervals on a circle.
Each of the approval sets A0, A1, . . . , An−1 is an n×n square, with sides parallel to the sides of X , whose
lower-left corners are located at evenly-spaced points along Γ. Figure 7 illustrates the n = 9 case, marking
these points by yellow dots. Specifically, for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}, the lower-left corner of Ai is located at
(2i, 4i), with the second coordinate reduced modulo 2n.
0
0
2n
2n
Γ
A0
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
A7
A8
Figure 7. Construction of a (2, 2)-agreeable uniform toroidal society with n = 9 voters.
Since any two n × n squares placed in X with sides parallel to the coordinate axes must intersect, the
society S, constructed above, is (2, 2)-agreeable.
Recall that ℓ = n−14 . We now show that a(S) = ℓ+1. Since corresponding corners of each approval set lie
on equally-spaced points on Γ, each approval set has the same pattern of intersection with the others. Thus,
without loss of generality, it suffices to restrict our attention to one approval set, A0. First, the top-right
corner point of A0 is contained in A1, . . . , Aℓ, so a(S) ≥ ℓ+1. We next show that no point of A0 is contained
in more than ℓ other approval sets, and hence a(S) ≤ ℓ+ 1 as well.
Consider the four approval sets A1, A1+ℓ, A1+2ℓ, A1+3ℓ, illustrated in Figure 8. Observe that each of these
approval sets overlaps a different corner of A0, and that no two of these approval sets intersect within A0.
(We invite the reader to verify this by examining the coordinates of these sets within X .)
More generally, for j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, the four approval sets Aj , Aj+ℓ, Aj+2ℓ, Aj+3ℓ each intersect one corner of
A0, but do not intersect each other within A0. To see this, observe that the lower-left corner of Aj is (2j, 4j),
the upper-right corner is Aj+ℓ is (2j +(n− 1)/2, 4j− 1), and so on. That is, the approval sets A1, . . . , An−1
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can be partitioned into ℓ collections Cj = {Aj, Aj+ℓ, Aj+2ℓ, Aj+3ℓ}, each containing four approval sets, such
that for each j, no two members of Cj intersect within A0.
Thus, no point of A0 is contained in more than one of the approval sets in any Cj , for any j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ},
and so no point of A0 is contained in more than ℓ other approval sets, so a(S) ≤ ℓ + 1. Therefore, a(s) =
ℓ+ 1 = n−14 + 1.
A0
A1
A1+ℓ
A1+2ℓ
A1+3ℓ
Figure 8. The collection C1 = {A1, A1+ℓ, A1+2ℓ, A1+3ℓ} contains four approval sets, no two
of which intersect within A0.
For n 6≡ 1 (mod 4), let ℓ =
⌈
n−1
4
⌉
. First construct the (2, 2)-agreeable toroidal society for 4ℓ + 1 voters
as above (the number of voters in this society is up to 3 more than n), which has agreement number
a(S) = ℓ+ 1. Then remove the extra approval sets; this cannot increase the agreement number a(S). Since
we do not remove A0, A1, . . . , Aℓ, all of which intersect, the agreement number remains ℓ+1. This produces
a (2, 2)-agreeable toroidal society S with a(S) = ℓ+ 1 =
⌈
n−1
4
⌉
+ 1.
The uniform toroidal societies constructed above allow us to establish the sharpness of Theorems 7 and 15,
as stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 17. The lower bound on the agreement number of (2, 2)-agreeable toroidal societies given by
Theorem 7 is sharp when |S| ≡ 0 or 1 (mod 4), and the lower bound given by Theorem 15 is sharp when
|S| ≡ 0, 1, or 3 (mod 4).
Proof. By Theorem 7, the agreement number of a (2, 2)-agreeable toroidal society satisfies the following
inequality: a(S) > |S|4 . When |S| ≡ 0 or 1 (mod 4), this inequality is equivalent to
a(S) ≥
⌈
|S| − 1
4
⌉
+ 1.
Example 16 provides a family of (2, 2)-agreeable toroidal societies that achieve this lower bound. Therefore,
the bound in Theorem 7 is sharp.
The lower bound given by Theorem 15 is equivalent to that given by Theorem 7 for (2, 2)-agreeable
toroidal societies when |S| ≡ 0 or 1 (mod 4). When |S| ≡ 3 (mod 4), the societies in Example 16 achieve
the lower bound given by Theorem 15. Therefore, the bound in Theorem 15 is also sharp in these cases. 
Note that the agreement number of the uniform toroidal societies in Example 16 is one greater than the
bound given in Theorems 7 and 15 when |S| ≡ 2 (mod 4). However, we suspect that the agreement number
of the societies in Example 16 is lowest possible for (2, 2)-agreeable toroidal societies. We offer the following
conjecture.
Conjecture 18. The lower bound on the agreement number of (2, 2)-agreeable toroidal societies given by
Theorems 7 and 15, a(S) > |S|4 , is not sharp for |S| ≡ 2 (mod 4).
We invite the reader to investigate the sharpness of our lower bounds for the agreement number of (k,m)-
agreeable toroidal societies where k and m are not both 2.
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